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Abstract 
A prominent facet of recent changes in agriculture has been the advent of precision 
breeding techniques. Another has been an increase in the level of information inputs and 
outputs associated with agricultural production. This paper identifies ways in which these 
features may complement in expanding the variety of processed products, the level of 
productivity, and the rate of change in productivity. Using a martingale concept of “more 
information,” we identify conditions under which more information increases the 
incentives to invest and engage in product differentiation. A theory on how genetic 
uniformity can enhance the rate of learning through process experimentation, and so the 
rate of technical change, is also developed.  
 
Keywords: experimentation, genetics, information, martingale, sorting, uniformity,  
value added. 
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GENETIC INFORMATION IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND  
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
Two of the most important economic innovations over the past half-century have been 
the ability to store and process large amounts of data and the development of techniques 
that modify life forms to meet specific ends. In agriculture, the latter has been a significant 
factor in productivity growth for both the crop and livestock sectors. The effects of 
innovations in information technology on production agriculture have been far more 
limited. Whereas product innovation and differentiation have been identified as the avenues 
to success by most industrial firms, production agriculture has continued down its path of 
producing low-cost commodities. History has shown that the keys to success in a 
commodity market are expansion to capture scale economies and specialization to adopt 
cost-reducing technologies more rapidly. Returns to managing information in commodity 
markets have arisen mainly from cost-saving applications in processing and distribution 
rather than from developing production systems that tailor production to consumer demand. 
While the technical capacity to focus on addressing consumer demands now exists, 
consumer demands for variety generally have not yet been met. Neither have consumer 
and processor demands for information about on-farm activities. For example, recalls of 
potentially contaminated meat have been far larger than they would have been had a food 
traceability system been in place. And efforts to improve beef quality have been impeded 
by the lack of information about the genetic traits of cattle and the production practices of 
heterogeneous producers (Boleman et al. 1997; Miller et al. 2001; National Cattlemen’s 
Association 1994, 1995). 
If production agriculture is to have a future in producing inputs with desired 
traits—be they genetic or non-genetic such as knowledge about the animal welfare 
practice used to produce a given piece of meat—then new investments in information 
technology and genetics must take place. The intent of this paper is to develop an 
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understanding of the mechanisms by which genetics and information interact in 
determining commercial decisions. 
We focus first on the return from information about input attributes that a processor 
can use to increase the likelihood that value-added processing will be successful. 
Currently, consumers are demanding products that are more convenient and a consistent 
consumption experience (Ulrich and Brewin 1999; Ferrier 2002). In order to remain 
competitive, processors must add further value to meet the demands of restaurants and 
domestic consumers. Processors will attempt to differentiate their product only if they 
know that the raw material they purchase from farmers will perform reliably during 
processing. We develop a model that characterizes how information plays a role in the 
decision to develop new markets for product derivatives. As technical attributes of the 
raw material become more certain, the material can be better sorted to improve 
uniformity. This makes it optimal to engage in more product differentiation. We illustrate 
the model with reference to soybean crops through the twentieth century. 
We then turn to an exploration of how management efficiencies can also arise from 
information on the nature of raw materials. We demonstrate how ex ante sorting to obtain 
homogeneous lots of raw materials increases the information content of experiments in 
production because controlled experiments provide less noisy results. Thus, the returns 
from experimentation increase, which leads to more production and processing 
experiments. We provide evidence to show that this learning story is consistent with 
events in the U.S. poultry and hog sectors over the past 70 years.1 
Our two modeling frameworks lend support to the notion that the keys to an 
agricultural sector that delivers inexpensive, differentiated inputs to processors who use 
them to meet new consumer demands are a strong knowledge base concerning genetics, 
the capacity to cheaply sort production into homogeneous lots, and a highly controlled 
production/processing environment. Concerning the latter, a low age at slaughter permits 
a more controlled production environment, and so, the theory predicts, poultry products 
should more readily meet consumer demands than beef or even pork products. Finally, 
we suggest that cloning and other technologies that promote uniformity in raw materials 
may have a profound impact on commercial animal agriculture.  
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Information and Value-Adding Activities 
A processor buys raw material from farmers and has the choice of transforming it 
into either a standard product, A, which generates unit revenue P  with certainty, or an 
alternative product, B, which is novel. The standard product uses technology that is well 
tried and tested. This does not mean that there is not significant variation in the standard 
(commodity) product but rather that the technology is less specific and more flexible in 
adapting to variations. For example, the technology may be more labor intensive, in 
which case human intervention can better accommodate variation. 
The novel product generates unit revenue, net of additional costs, amounting to 
P  +  δ  if all goes as planned. However, because of inconsistent input attributes, there is a 
risk that the product does not turn out as planned and a loss is incurred. We identify the 
loss as L +∈  and capture the risk of this loss by the true loss probability 
( ) (0, 1)K     
∞
ω ∈ , where the choice of the subscripted infinity symbol will be explained 
shortly. As suggested by the notation, this loss probability can be altered by an 
investment, the level of which is represented as K  +∈ . While the loss, if it occurs, is 
not random, the loss probability is a random variable because it depends upon product 
attributes—such as genetics—and the processor of any given lot of raw materials is 
incompletely informed about these attributes. 
In presenting our model of how information affects decisions, we first consider an 
environment in which the processor is fully informed about the determinants of ( )K
∞
ω , 
where these determinants can be observed and where sorting incurs no costs. This 
information is used to sort product into that which is processed and that which is not. For 
a given K , the true distribution of product reliability is [ ( )]H K
∞ ∞
ω . Assuming risk 
neutrality, or assuming large numbers of units of raw materials and appealing to the 
Glivenko-Cantelli theorem (Durrett 1996, p. 59), expected product revenue reflects the 
processor’s benefit function. Under the standard product, the expected benefit is P . 
Under the novel product and full information, the expected benefit from processing a lot 
of input is ( )P  L K
∞
+ δ − ω . Therefore, ( ) /K L
∞
ω = δ  is the cutoff point such that a unit 
with ( ) ( ) /K L
∞
ω < > δ  should (should not) be subjected to novel processes. The cutoff 
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point is independent of the value of K , although the fraction of raw material that is 
processed is not. 
The added value to the fully informed processor of sorting raw materials, relative to 
the base of not allocating any raw materials to the production of novel product B, is  
 ( ) max[0, ( )] [ ( )] ,V K L K dH K
∞ ∞ ∞
= δ − ω ω∫  (1) 
where fraction [ / ]H L
∞
δ  is processed and fraction 1 [ / ]H L
∞
− δ  is not. 
To capture the concept of being “more informed” about processing and about the 
nature of the inputs used, we will apply the notion of a martingale process.2 We start with 
the baseline empty information set, 0( )  K  K += ∅ ∀ ∈ , which gives rise to a K -
conditioned reliability assessment random variable, 0( )Kω . This baseline empty 
information set is “observation unconditional” in the sense that one learns nothing new 
from observing the raw material. And the observation unconditionality is true regardless 
of the level of investment chosen. The observation unconditional random variable has the 
distribution function 0 0[ ( )]H Kω .  
A strictly larger information set 1 0( ) ( )K   K⊃   gives rise to the 1( )K -
conditioned reliability assessment random variable 1( )Kω . Continuing, we may conceive 
of a sequence, possibly countably infinite, of increasingly informed environments 
0{ ( )}ii iK ≤∞=  where 0( )K ⊂  1( ) ( ) ( )iK K K∞⊂ ⊂ ⊂ ⊂… …    and each is a σ -
algebra.3 Such a collection of information sets is called a filtration. The sense in which 
1( ) ( )i iK K+⊂   merits pause for thought. One might think of a filtration as a set of 
documents that might accompany raw materials. Document 0 ( )K  reveals no 
information about the material, and document 1( )K  reveals one relevant piece of 
information. Continuing, document ( ),  i K i ∈  {1, 2 , . . . }          reveals one additional 
conditionally independent relevant piece of information over that contained in 1( )i K− .4 
Suppose, for example, a coin was flipped three times in sequence with outcomes 
1 {0,1},A  ∈  2 {0,1},A ∈  and 3 {0,1}A   ∈ . Ignoring the investment level, we might define 
the space of events on the first toss as 1 {{0}, {1}}   = , the event space on the first two 
Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development / 5 
tosses as 2 {{0, 0}, =  {0,1},{1, 0},{1,1}}   , and the event space on the first three tosses as 
3 {{0, 0, 0}, {0, 0,1},      =  {0,1, 0},{0,1,1},{1, 0, 0},{1, 0,1},{1,1, 0},{1,1,1}}            . We have that 
1 2 3⊂ ⊂    in the sense that the more inclusive set fills out information on events in 
the largest event space.  
In our study of reliability, we associate with the filtration a sequence of random 
variables 0{ ( )}ii iK ≤∞=ω  where ( ) (0,1)i Kω ∈  is the expected reliability when conditioned on 
events captured in ( )i K . For each K , the largest information set, ( )K∞ , contains all 
relevant information. To avoid the possibility of confusion at a later juncture, we 
distinguish between the ordinal size of the information set at a given level of K  and the 
level of K  by defining the ith largest information set as { }i  rather than ( )i K . Using 
this notation, if one knows which of the events in { }∞  has occurred then one knows the 
true value of the reliability parameter, that is, of ( )K
∞
ω . 
Expectations with respect to 0 0[ ( )]H Kω  (i.e., unconditional expectations) are 
denoted by 0[ | ( )]E K⋅   or [ ]E ⋅  and, in general, expectations conditioned on events that 
are specified in ( )i K  are represented by [ | ( )]iE K⋅  . We make the following: 
 
ASSUMPTION 1. 0( ) [ ( )] /K E K   L  K∞ +ω = ω ≥ δ ∀ ∈ . 
 
Viewing equation (1), this assumption states that, irrespective of the level of 
investment, it is rational not to subject any raw materials to novel technology B when 
0 ( )K    K += ∅ ∀ ∈ . The equality in the assumption warrants some explanation in that 
it imposes the martingale property. If 
 [ ( ) | ( )] [ ( ) | ( )] ( ) , , ,i j i iE K  K  E K  K   K   i   K   j i ∞ +ω = ω = ω ∀ ∀ ∈ ∀ ≥   (2) 
then the process of K -conditioned random variables represented by ( )i Kω  is said to be a 
martingale with respect to the filtration.5,6 Henceforth we will also suppose the following: 
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ASSUMPTION 2. For a given level of investment K , random variables 0{ ( )}ii iK ≤∞=ω  follow a 
martingale process in the manner of equation (2). 
 
EXAMPLE 1. Let , {1,2, , }i  i N∈ξ … , be a sequence of independent random variables with 
bounded support and mean zero. Then 1nin i S == ξ∑  is a martingale where each i  is 
given by the event space for 1 2{ , , , }  i    ξ ξ ξ… . 
 
EXAMPLE 2. The standard Wiener process generated from integrating across infinitesimal 
normal innovations underpins much of real and financial option theory. It is a 
(continuous) martingale (Trigeorgis 1996) with the appropriately defined filtration. 
However, since a normal distribution does not have a bounded support, we could not use 
this form of martingale to model our knowledge on reliability parameters. 
 
EXAMPLE 3. Let , {1, 2, , }i  i    N∈ξ …  be a sequence of random variables with bounded 
support. Define 1 2 -1[ | , , , ], {2, 3, , }i i i   i  E     i    N= − ∈η ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ… … , and 1 1    =η ξ . Then 
1
n
n iiS   == η∑  is a martingale where the i  are of the form given in Example 1. 
 
To be clear about how we intend to apply the martingale property, start with the 
environment where the stock of heterogeneous raw materials available to the processor is 
fixed so there is no randomness in the true mass distribution of raw materials. What is 
random is the perceived level of reliability. As the processor becomes more informed 
about the nature of the raw materials, this randomness converts to observed heterogeneity 
in the stock, that is, to known variability. In an environment where there is known 
variability, it is possible, at least conceptually, to sort, ex post, the raw materials.7  
Each ( )i Kω  has associated with it an absolutely continuous measure, [ ( )]i iH Kω , 
where we clarify our concept of information as an extension of a σ -algebra:  
 
DEFINITION 1. Make Assumption 2 given previously. Distribution [ ( )]i iH Kω  is said to be 
more informative than [ ( )]j jH Kω  whenever i j≥ . 
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There exists an intimate relationship between the martingale structure and the 
concept of a mean-preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). Specifically, if 
[ ( ) | ( )]i jE K  Kω ω  = ( )j K  ω ∀  i j≥ , then [ ( )]i iH Kω  is more dispersed than [ ( )]j jH Kω  
in the sense of a mean-preserving spread. Thus, [ ( )]i iH Kω  is more informative than 
[ ( )]j jH Kω because some noise has been explained and incorporated into the 
information set. 
Other economic concepts of information order exist. Chambers and Quiggin (2001) 
apply duality and set theory to model information in an Arrow-Debreu state-contingent 
framework. Athey and Levin (2001) use measure theory to provide an exact notion for 
“more information” that pertains in the case of optimization problems with some 
specified analytic structure. While their approach is applicable to our problem, we choose 
not to use it here because the stochastic attributes of the approach are not as well explored 
as the martingale concept by which we will characterize “more information.” In game 
theory, the standard approach to modeling more information employs the Markov process 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). In it, all probabilities of a future event are held to depend 
only on the present state and not on past states of nature. Because the probability density 
function is completely described, this Markov condition is more imposing than the 
martingale condition as given in equation (2). Our analysis does not require this level of 
structure, and so we do not impose it. 
Returning to equation (1), in imperfectly informed environments we may write  
 [ ] [ ][ ( )] Max[0, [ ( )]]    Max[0, ( )]  .i iV K   E LE k E L k∞= δ − ω = δ − ω  (3) 
This expression reflects the value of more information on the nature of the product. More 
information may make it a good bet to allocate some of the raw materials to novel 
product B and thus access some surplus relative to the standard product, A. 
Now, by the convexity of the max[ , ]⋅ ⋅  statement, Jensen’s inequality, and the 
observation that 
[ ]max[0, [ ( ) | ( )]]iE LE K K∞δ − ω   [ ]1=  max[0, [ [ ( ) | ( )] | ( )]]i iE LE E K K K∞ +δ − ω    
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[ ]1[max[0, [ ( ) | ( )]] | ( )]i iE E LE K K K∞ +≤ δ − ω    
[ ]1max[0, [ ( ) | ( )]] ,iE LE K K∞ += δ − ω   
we have8  
 1 0[ ( )]   [ ( )]   [ ( )] [ ( )].iV  K   V K   V  K V K  ∞ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥… …     (4) 
To interpret the inequalities, we make the following:9  
 
ASSUMPTION 3. Sorting is costless. 
 
Consider now the situation where no additional information becomes available to the 
processor. So {0} is the pertinent information set, and we may write  
 [ ] [ ]0 0 0[ ( )] max[0, [ ( ) | ( )]] max 0, ( )] 0,V K   E LE K K L K∞= δ − ω = δ − ω =   (5) 
where the last equality is due to Assumption 1. Consequently, no product differentiation 
occurs. A larger information set, in providing opportunities to condition expectations, 
allows an expansion of the capacity to sort product. In a concrete setting, more 
information allows for ex post sorting of product. Somewhat more abstractly, more 
information on genetic composition may allow for better ex ante sorting. In these 
contexts, “more information” may be viewed as a transformation of uncertainty to known 
variability, and the rational processor will make best use of the known variability by 
sorting product into that which will be subjected to the novel process and that which will 
not. In the manner of type I and type II errors, the additional information allows for two 
kinds of efficiencies. The information makes less likely the event that product allocated 
to use B fails during processing while the information also makes less likely the event 
that product allocated to use A was actually of the quality that should have been allocated 
to use B. It is the action of sorting that underpins relation (4), and it may be encapsulated 
as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. The value of a given level of investment increases as the processor 
becomes more informed in the sense of Definition 1. 
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The result does not, however, provide insight into the incentive to increase the level 
of investment. In fact, it cannot do so because the problem has insufficient structure. We 
will now place sufficient structure on the problem. Notice that the max[  , ]⋅ ⋅  statement in 
equation (3) is decreasing and convex in the random variable. Hence, the marginal 
product of investment K  on the part of the processor, and for a given information set 
( )i K , is positive if an increase in K  induces a second-degree stochastically dominated 
shift in [ ( )]i iH Kω . For the same stock of raw materials, if an increase in K  induces such 
a stochastic shift, then c will tend to be lower and less dispersed at higher values of K .  
To summarize the structure that we have imposed on the random variable ( )i Kω , 
observe that it is ordered in two dimensions. The martingale orders it by the second 
ordinate in ( ,{ })K i  while stochastic dominance orders it by the first ordinate in the 
ordered pair. We have not yet imposed any structure on how the two ordinates might 
interact. We can now adapt to our context a concept attributable to Topkis (1978). 
 
DEFINITION 2. (Topkis 1978) Let K ∈  and let T  be a partially ordered set with order 
relation 
*
≥ . Function ( , ) :G K  t  T× →   is said to have increasing differences in ( , )K  t  
if, for 
*
t t′ ≥ , it holds that ( , ) ( , )G K  t G K  t′ −  is monotone nondecreasing in K . 
 
Observe that the filtration is totally ordered by inclusion relation ⊂ , and so it is 
partially ordered by that relation. Note too that if, as will be the case, the property of 
increasing differences is required of a function defined on ( ,{ })K  i , then structure will be 
imposed on how coordinate interactions affect the function value.10 
 
RESULT 1. (Topkis 1978) For any sets S ⊂   and S  ′ ⊂ , define the partial ordering 
r
S S′≤  as the relation whereby inf{ } inf{ }S   S′≤  and sup{ } sup{ }S S′≤ . If 
( , ) :G K  t  T× →   has increasing differences in ( , )K  t  then 
*
( , ) ( , )  arg max arg max
r
K KG K t G K t t t′ ′≤ ∀ ≥ . 
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Without imposing much structure on the problem, the result basically relates that the 
optimal values of K  are weakly increasing in the value of t . And so, with [ ( )]iM K  
[ ( )]iV K  K= −  as the processor’s objective to be maximized, Result 1 implies the 
following: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Let K  induce a second-degree stochastically dominated shift in any 
given [ ( )]i iH Kω , and let [ ( )] [ ( )]j iV K  V K−   be monotone nondecreasing in 
K  i j∀ ≤ . Then the optimal level of investment increases in the sense of 
r
≤  as the firm 
becomes more informed.  
 
Proposition 2 is consistent with Chandler’s (1992) argument that, in order to justify 
the capital investment, a firm has to be able to more closely monitor throughput in 
capital-intensive industries. We will return to the issue of throughput later. Notice, we do 
not actually need the second-degree stochastic partial ordering on distributions to apply 
Result 1. Its only role is to ensure that expected marginal product is positive. 
One may wonder how investment and product differentiation activities interrelate. 
To address this issue, we first need to know what the direct role of more information is on 
product differentiation activities.11 
 
PROPOSITION 3. There exists an information set *{ }i , possibly { }∞  or {0} , such that  
a. All larger sets in the filtration will be associated with the production of both 
standard product A and novel product B; 
b.  All smaller sets in the filtration will be associated with the production of just 
standard product A. 
 
Proposition 3 does not assume increasing differences. But, taken together, that is, 
under the assumptions in Proposition 2, it can be seen that more information drives both 
higher investment and product differentiation.12 Consequently, we can identify two 
reasons why one might expect more high-value products from processors that are well 
informed. First, they are better at sorting raw materials. Second, if the increasing 
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differences property holds, then the comparative advantage at sorting converts to a 
stronger incentive to upgrade the firm’s investment so that it can better glean value-added 
product from the given raw materials base. 
Part (a) of Proposition 3 often may only identify a restricted equilibrium. Ex post 
sorting of product to ensure reliability is costly. It may be possible to substitute these 
transactions costs for lower ex ante sorting transactions costs if the pertinent information 
is available to breed for homogeneous raw materials. If the differentiated product proves 
profitable under high ex post sorting costs, then optimizing firms may be reassured about 
the prospects of allocating resources for seeking an ex ante solution. The information that 
allowed for the ex post sorting solution surely will be of assistance in developing an ex 
ante sorting solution. 
Propositions 2 and 3 bear contrasting with the analysis in Hennessy 1996, where a 
downstream operator uses the spot market to assess and then purchase product from a 
producer. Grading errors blur the mean return on a given level of investment for the 
producer, and thus the producer-level incentives to make an investment that would 
upgrade the quality of product (i.e., raw material going into processing) are not clear. In 
that context, the problem was one of asymmetric information in that the producer knew 
the production practices in place whereas the processor only had available quality 
assessments through information discernible on the spot market. Vertical integration 
would solve the problem by removing the information asymmetry, as would ex ante 
contracts with sufficiently high-powered incentives structures, as Bogetoft and Olesen 
(2003) pointed out. 
In our model, there need not be information asymmetry. But the problem and 
consequences are similar. If we model a lower state of knowledge about the raw materials 
coming from farms as a shift { 1} { }i i+ →  along the filtration, then the processor receives 
a less informative signal. By Proposition 3, less product differentiation will tend to occur 
as a result, and the processor will not be in a position to reward the growers of highly 
processable raw materials. Consequently, producer incentives to invest in providing 
highly processable raw materials will decline. Both the producer and the processor may 
be caught in a rut of low investment. The point to bear in mind is that, in our model, the 
information conveyed by the grower to the processor is integrally embedded as part of the 
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raw materials. The more information the grower can credibly provide, the larger the 
realized reward likely will be when surplus from processing is divided and distributed 
back. The spot market is not a good institution for credibly conveying information on raw 
materials, and so our model would suggest that processors seeking to add considerable 
value to raw materials are more likely to use direct procurement channels than are 
processors focused on undifferentiated products. 
 
Case Study: Soybean Product Development 
Arguably, soybean has been the most aggressively developed field crop through the 
twentieth century. While soybean products have comprised part of the staple diet in East 
Asia since ancient times, demand elsewhere did not become significant until around 1908 
when an English firm speculated on developing products for sale to diabetics. However, 
the “killer application” proved to be crusher-extracted oil for soaps, with by-product cake 
and meal sold as a protein supplement for animal feed (Piper and Morse 1923). Between 
1910 and 1920, and after extensive product research, soap and paint manufacturers 
propelled a growing demand for the crop. 
Until the 1930s, extraction processes left the meal contaminated by residues so that 
uses in human foods were precluded. Then innovations in extraction allowed for the 
development of soy flour as an ingredient in such items as ice creams, candies, breads, 
confectionaries, and prepared mixes (Windish 1981, p. 99). At about this time, too, 
industrial uses of crop products began to languish, as they were being replaced by 
petroleum derivatives. Comparatively, soybean products performed inconsistently and 
were more susceptible to contamination (Myers 1994; Hammond 1995). 
Nonetheless, crop utilization had gained traction in feed and food markets. Global 
soybean production grew from 12 million tons, mostly in China, in the mid-1930s to 
surpass 100 million tons in the late 1980s with the majority being harvested in the United 
States. (den Boer 1991). Product and varietal development programs underpinned the 
growth in U.S. production and global consumption (Windish 1981). Being an annual 
crop, it lends itself more readily to genetic innovations than oil crops from trees 
(Hammond 1995).13 Compared with other annual oilseed crops, the soybean’s innate 
versatility has encouraged the speculative research that is required to extend the filtration 
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of σ -algebras necessary for product development. Contemporary research efforts continue 
to work on product reliability issues. Efforts to expand food market opportunities include 
endeavors to eliminate the off-flavors (Narvel 1997) and to use in a reliable manner highly 
saturated soybean oil in the production of trans-free margarine (Kok 1998). Instability, for 
example under oxidation, and other performance inconsistencies remain a major problem in 
penetrating industrial markets (Hammond 1995) and are a significant area of product 
development research (e.g., Jiang 2000; Ruger 1999). 
 
Genetics and Information Management 
The arguments that will be articulated in this section provide the components of a 
dynamic framework to explain some of the forces behind the industrialization of animal 
agriculture. The role of innovation in the industrial evolution of firms over time has been 
largely neglected in the industrial organization literature. The seminal work explaining 
Schumpeter’s famous thesis on firm evolution in a dynamic framework is attributable to 
Nelson and Winter (1982). Two of their theoretical findings are relevant to the present 
study: (a) firms that experiment (innovate) grow relative to firms that imitate, and smaller 
firms disappear; (b) industries with comparatively high rates of technological progress 
are characterized by comparatively high levels of average research and development 
intensity and concentrated structures upon maturity. Both of these conjectures are 
consistent with events in U.S. poultry and pork production sectors. 
As to why agriculture did not industrialize as extensively as other production 
processes, Allen and Lueck (1998) suggest that the viability of the family farm has much 
to do with moral hazard problems that arise from the seasonal and random nature of the 
production environment. In this section, we will point to other consequences of non-
uniformities in the production environment that may have affected the structural 
evolution of agriculture. We claim that non-uniform genetics have comprised a 
bottleneck in learning about more productive technologies. As such, our argument is 
similar in flavor to Chandler’s thesis that, relative to labor-intensive technologies, capital-
intensive production processes tend to require high rates of throughput in order to capture 
scale economies. Be it at production or processing stages, genetic non-uniformities likely 
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impede throughput and therefore, consistent with the arguments of Allen and Lueck 
(1998), may support a more labor-intensive approach to production. 
Next, we develop our arguments, first through reference to the recent history of the 
poultry sector, and then by modeling production efficiencies that arise from uniformities 
and that are alluded to by commentators on the industry. Finally, we describe changes in 
the hog sector with reference to the poultry sector. 
The U.S. Poultry Sector 
As with the reproductive cycle of poultry in comparison with other agricultural 
livestock, the history of specialized poultry production for meat has been a short and 
rapidly maturing one. Poultry and egg production had been highly fragmented until the 
1920s (Schwartz 1991; Bugos 1992).14 Indeed, the advent of the commercial broiler 
industry in the United States is often credited to Mrs. W. Steele, who maintained an egg-
laying flock in Maryland during the 1920s. At that time, poultry meat was overwhelm-
ingly the by-product of laying flocks. Egg laying had just begun its journey toward 
industrialization. Mrs. Steele sold her young laying flock as meat, making a significant 
profit. Thereafter, she maintained specialized flocks for meat production. Neighbors 
imitated her actions, thus establishing the Delaware-Maryland-Virginia (Delmarva) 
Peninsula as the main center of poultry meat production in the United States until after 
World War II.  
Among the main problems facing the young industry were disease control, nutrition, 
and genetics quality. Chief among the problems arising from poultry DNA were natural 
tendencies toward seasonal patterns in behavior. The advent of vaccines and vitamin-
enriched feed helped move the industry toward realizing greater scale economies through 
the 1930s, as did innovations in housing infrastructure. And scale economies seemed to 
go hand in hand with greater vertical coordination. 
A key factor in discovering industry cost and revenue potential was the improved 
control of the bird’s genetic profile. The emphasis here was on two general themes, the 
most obvious being direct productivity enhancement. But, as with feed, vaccine, and 
housing innovations, flock uniformity was also very important.15 On the processing side, 
uniformity facilitated automation, in deboning for example (Schwartz 1991; GAO 1999). 
At the same time, more value could be added because the raw material would behave 
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more consistently as steps in processing were introduced. M. J. Thomas, a Kroger 
supermarket representative, asserted in 1958 that integration in livestock agriculture 
would help the growing supermarket sector to offer stable volumes of uniform quality to 
customers.16 And, as we will argue, greater consistency may have encouraged more 
experimentation in cost reduction and quality enhancement by removing noise from 
attempts to learn during production and processing. 
Broiler breeding became a commercial business during the 1930s and moved south 
with the majority of production after World War II. Initially, the emphasis was on 
purebred lines to ensure flock uniformity. However, by 1950 it was becoming clear that 
the hybridization techniques developed in the seed corn industry could enhance 
homogeneity in genetic expression while achieving an additional boost from hybrid 
vigor. And, for breeding companies, the hybridization approach provided the additional 
benefit of natural protection for intellectual property because the sold bird could not be 
used for consistent replication. 
By 1960, broiler production was both highly industrialized and integrated; its 
organizational form did not undergo any substantial changes in the 40 years to follow. 
Yet, surplus generated by the industry has improved dramatically over those 40 years. 
Table 1 provides data on U.S. poultry, pork, and beef consumption and prices from 1930 
through 2000. It can be seen that the sum of chicken (the term used by U.S. government 
statistics collectors for spent mature birds) and broiler outputs grew more rapidly over 
any 10-year period than did either cattle output or hog output. And the relative price of 
broilers declined dramatically, whether the metric for comparison is cattle prices or hog 
prices. For example, the price of broilers relative to the hog price declined by about 2.3 
percent per year from 1940 through 2000. The decline relative to the beef price was 2.6 
percent for the same period. 
The rise of poultry consumption was due in part to productivity effects in commodity 
production, the ability of the industry to differentiate product, and other means of 
adjusting to consumer demands (Schwartz 1991; Hudspeth 1989). In 1928, broilers were 
killed at 112 days and at 1.7 kg, with feed conversion efficiency of about 13.3 kg feed per 
kg weight gain (Bugos 1992). By 1994, 37-day broilers weighed about 1.7 kg, while feed 
conversion efficiency was about 1.68 kg feed per kg weight gain to 37 days (Nicolson  
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TABLE 1. Animal production and prices, United States, 1930–2000 
 1930 1940 1950   1960   1970 1980 1990 2000   
Quantity (mil lbs)a 
Chicken 2,643 2,158 2,310 1,142 1,185 1,178  981e 1,112e  
Broilersd b 414 1,944 6,017 10,820 15,538 25,631 41,623 
Hogs 15,176 17,043 20,214 19,203 21,861 23,402 21,287 25,730 
Cattle and  
Calves 13,263 15,702 21,185 28,796 39,521 40,284 39,202 42,842 
 
Prices ($/cwt) 
Chickenc 18.40 13.20 22.20 12.20 9.10 11.00 9.60 5.70 
Broilersc b 17.30 27.40 16.90 13.60 27.70 32.60 33.60 
Hogs 8.84 5.390 18.00 15.30 22.70 38.00 53.70 42.30 
Cattle 7.71 7.56 23.30 22.90 34.50 62.40 74.60 71.30 
Source: USDA-NASS Agricultural Statistics, various. 
a
 Liveweight. 
b
 97 million pounds of broilers were reported in 1934 at price 19.3¢/lb. 
c
 Reported as ¢/lb. 
d
 Not included in farm production of chickens. 
e
 Reported as pounds sold. 
 
 
1998). As for product differentiation, it is believed by some observers that poultry meat is 
about 20 years ahead of other meats in tailoring products to value-added consumer 
submarkets (Kilman 2001). In the model to follow, we provide an explanation of the origin 
of this performance differential between poultry and other meats. 
Incentives to Learn 
Environmental control has always been recognized as a significant factor in 
determining (static) producer performance (see, e.g., Lacey 1999 or Ritchie 2001). 
Perhaps more important, however, are the implications of a controlled environment for 
dynamic performance, and modern poultry farms are well suited for experimentation. In 
the typical poultry production contract in the United States, the integrator attains 
considerable control over the production environment by imposing genetic, feed, 
medication, and housing inputs. In assessing how the role of research in the boiler 
industry may change in the new century, Nicolson (1998) has stated: 
…the gap between the conditions for chickens on research units and 
the conditions on commercial farms is widening. In most cases, the 
farms are better equipped to monitor environmental conditions and 
feed intakes on a frequent basis than the trial units. The commercial 
farm will be made up of a number of large houses up to 50,000 birds 
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and, in a more modern unit, be equipped with pan feeders, nipple 
drinkers and sophisticated ventilation systems which control the tem-
perature as well as the humidity and CO2 concentration. Daily feed 
allowances and body weights may be closely monitored by a computer 
controlled system which allows the stockman hour-by-hour control. 
It would seem then that while the industrialization of broiler production may have 
enabled the sector to avoid transactions costs impediments to glean better technical and 
economic performance from the livestock, sector structure was important for dynamic 
process related reasons as well.17 The process would appear to have been a mechanism 
for delivering continued improvements in performance. In the model to follow, we will 
seek to capture one means through which the process might give rise to dynamic 
productivity effects.18 
Let the aggregate property to be managed, in this case a flock or herd, be composed 
of n  genetic types labeled 1 through n . Fractions 0ia ≥  of the aggregate are of the ith 
type, 1 1
n
ii a= =∑ . The curious entrepreneur has assembled a continuum of conjectures 
that he or she would like to try out on the next lots of the aggregate to enter the 
production process. 
The conjectures can be ranked in terms of their potential according to a unidimen-
sional index of potential, ( ; , , ) 0g b q Tκ η > , where each conjecture can be tested 
independently, that is, without interfering with each other. Variable [ , ]b  b b  ∈ ⊂  is an 
index of projects, and q  is the level of output at the entrepreneur’s firm. The ranking 
gives ( ; , , )b b q Tg κ η > 0. Parameter κ  is an index of curiosity (about serendipitous 
events) in assembling these conjectures, and we assume that the more curious operator 
has collected a stronger portfolio of conjectures so that ( ; , , ) 0b q Tg κ κ η > . It is also 
assumed that the potential increases with q  because innovations can be leveraged over 
larger volumes of output. Variable η  is nonnegative and random, reflecting the 
consequences of uncontrolled aspects of the production environment per unit of time. 
Variable T  is the age at slaughter so that  Tη  is a measure of cumulative randomness in 
the general production environment over the duration of the production process. We hold 
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that ( ; , , )g b q Tκ η  is decreasing in argument  Tη  so that noise confounds the attainment 
of insights. 
Conjecture b , when implemented in a production process, carries with it profit 
impact 
,i bε  for the i th genetic type. Ex ante, the , , {1, 2, , }i b i    nε ∈ …  are random but there 
is no noise in observing the 
,i bε  and the ex post observed impacts are subsequently stable 
over time. Upon trying out conjecture b, the entrepreneur believes that his or her business 
will be subjected to a profit impact of ba ⋅ ε  if the index of potential is omitted. Here, 
,1
n
b i i bia  a=⋅ ε ≡ ε∑  is the type-weighted impact of b  on profits, ignoring ( )g ⋅  and the 
option not to implement the technique under inquiry. The index enters in a multiplicative 
manner, so that the one-time profit impact of the innovation is ( ; , , ) bg b q  T  aκ η ⋅ ε

. 
Random variable η  is held to be independent of b ε

, and a technique will only be 
introduced if it improves profit, that is, if max[  , 0] 0ba ⋅ ε ≥

. Each experiment requires sunk 
cost c > 0, and the continuous-time discount rate per unit of time over the production period 
is given by r > 0. We hold that the consequences of most experiments will only be 
identified at slaughter, so that benefits should be discounted by the factor rTe− . 
The profit-driven operator will be willing to check out a conjecture if and only if the 
capitalized, discounted, expected benefit exceeds cost; ( ; , , , , ) 0Y b a q c T  κ ≥  where  
 
{ ( ; , , )} {max[ , 0]}( ; , , , , )   ,b
rT
E g b q  T  E aY b a q c T   c
re
κ η ⋅ ε
κ = −

 (6) 
and {}E ⋅  signifies the expectation operator over the pertinent random vector. Here a  is 
an index of homogeneity as reflected by the composition of vector a . The precise nature 
of the index will be explained shortly. Denote the “break-even” project satisfying 
( ; ) 0Y b ⋅ =  as *( )b ⋅  which is implicitly a function of the other arguments of ( )Y ⋅  in (6). If 
the weighting measure on [ , ]b b  is ( )Aφ  for [ , ]A b b⊆ , then the measure of implemented 
projects is *([ , ])b bφ . A comment is warranted concerning the appropriateness of 
objective function (6). The function assumes that the firm cannot be an easy-rider on 
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innovations by other firms. In reality, easy-riding behavior will likely dampen incentives 
to innovate. 
At this juncture, explicit structure is required on the bε  if we are to make sense of 
when standardizing innovations have determinate effects on the set of conjectures that 
solve ( ) 0Y  ⋅ ≥ . First, while realization bε

 depends upon conjecture b , the underlying 
distribution from which it is drawn is held to be common across all conjectures. Second, 
we assume that the components of bε

 are exchangeable.19 For exchangeable random 
variables, it is well known among mathematical statisticians that function 
{max[ ,0]}bE a ⋅ ε

 is symmetric and convex in a  (see, e.g., Marshall and Olkin 1979, pp. 
287–88). Therefore, the function is Schur-convex. This means that {max[ ,0]}bE a ⋅ ε

 is 
larger under a′′  than under a′  whenever a′′  majorizes a′ . 
DEFINITION 3. (See Marshall and Olkin 1979, p. 7.) For vectors nu ∈   and nv ∈  , 
denote the respective kth largest components as [ ]ku  and [ ]kv . Write u v
 
≺  if  
a. [ ] [ ]1 1 {1, 2, , 1}i ik kk ku v  k   n= =≤ ∀ ∈ −∑ ∑ … ; and  
b. [ ] [ ]1 1
n n
k kk ku = v= =∑ ∑ . Then vector v  is said to majorize vector u . 
 
To illustrate, 31 1 1 28 8 2 3 3( , , ) (0, , )≺  because 71 22 3 8,  1,≤ ≤ , and 1 = 1. We will have 
particular interest in the extremes of the majorization relation;  
 
1 1
1( , , ) ( , , ) (1,0, ,0)na an n− −… ≺ … ≺ …  (7) 
for any a  with nonnegative components and on-the-unit simplex, that is, 1 1a ⋅ ≡

. 
We are now in a position to analyze determinants of incentives to experiment. 
 
DEFINITION 4. The aggregate as represented by a′′  is said to be more homogeneous than 
the aggregate as represented by a′  if a a′ ′′ ≺ . 
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While relation ≺  is a partial ordering, our concern is only with instances where 
vectors can be ordered. For convenience, then, we define the index of homogeneity a  
with some monotone map a a′ ′→ ∈   under which a a a a′ ′′ ′ ′′⇔ < ≺ .  
 
PROPOSITION 4.  
a. An increase in the homogeneity index, the curiosity index, or the level of firm 
output increases the number of experiments engaged in.  
b. An autonomous reduction in the slaughter date also increases the rate of 
experimentation. 
 
Noise, be it through genetics or other factors, reduces the expected returns to 
tinkering. In the extreme, let (1,0, ,0)a′′ = … , which could be interpreted as a cloned 
aggregate. This would elicit the largest level of experimentation. A clarification 
concerning the proposition involves the choice of the verb “tinker.” It was chosen to 
emphasize the engineering, rather than scientific, origin of the innovations that we seek to 
model. The realities of running a competitive business may leave little room for the 
paradigm-shifting innovations that occasionally may arise from fundamental research. 
The economics underpinning part (a) bears comparison with the concept of an 
economic tournament, a common remunerations structure in poultry production (Knoeber 
1989). Economic tournaments, if thoughtfully constructed, shift the shared performance 
risks of participants onto the contractor who may be best able to bear them. By removing 
this noise, performance incentives can be sharpened. Likewise, the removal of 
background noise allows for the sharpening of incentives to experiment. 
We have supposed that the set of conjectures was fixed and invariant to T . If, 
instead, the density of conjectures with index b  rises in strict proportion to T , then *b  
can be interpreted as the threshold hypothesis that would be accepted at any moment as 
hypotheses are recorded for possible testing. Note that the value of index a  likely also 
will affect the flow of conjectures. Ideas are likely to arise more readily if the level of 
background noise is low, so a large value of a  will likely also improve the flow and 
quality of conjectures. A low value of T , too, likely will have this effect. This is because 
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the entrepreneur will be more certain that events other than those known to him or her did 
not affect the outcome of events.  
Proposition 4 provides an explanation as to why the characteristics of poultry 
production assumed an industrial nature earlier than did those of later-maturing livestock. 
As T  declines, the rate of experimentation picks up. An assembly-line approach is 
possible only when the production characteristics are sufficiently well understood and 
controlled. Thus, there should be a negative correlation between age at slaughter and the 
“industrialization” status of production practices. 
To establish interactions between the curiosity index and the impact of environ-
mental homogeneity on experimentation, we invoke a strict, increasing (decreasing) 
single-crossing condition on ( )Y ⋅ . The condition is that 0[ ( ) / ( ) | ] /a b Yd Y Y d=⋅ ⋅ κ ( ) 0> <  for 
all argument evaluations, so that the indifference curves cross just once as κ  changes. 
 
PROPOSITION 5. Assume that b  is uniformly distributed on [ , ]b b . 
a. Let the strict, increasing (decreasing) single-crossing condition hold. Then an 
increase in homogeneity, a a′ ′′→ , leads to a larger (smaller) increase in experi-
ments done by the more curious than by the less curious. 
b. An increase in homogeneity, a a′ ′′→ , leads to a larger (smaller) increase in 
experiments done at high c  than at low c  if 2 2ln[ ( )] / ( ) 0d g db− ⋅ > < . 
 
Similarly, a strict single-crossing condition on ( )Y ⋅  as q  changes would generate a 
result for output analogous to that for the curiosity index. Notice that the uniformity of b  
across [ , ]b b  is important in Proposition 5. Were b  not uniform, then other explicit 
conditions on the distribution of b  would be required to map the impact on threshold 
conjectures into the impact on experiments conducted. 
Hog Sector 
Hogs for meat in the United States are slaughtered at 5 to 6 months of age, while 
beef cattle are seldom slaughtered below 15 months of age. Similarly, reproductive cycles 
are roughly twice as long for cattle relative to hogs. Proposition 4 suggests that hogs, if at 
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all, should undergo industrialization after poultry but before cattle. This theory is broadly 
supported by the evidence (Ritchie 2001). Beef production at the later stages is now 
overwhelmingly (85 to 90 percent) conducted in large feedlots in the High Plains region, 
but the efficiencies gained are largely scale in nature and the coordination of the 
production process from conception to consumption is very limited. 
The U.S. hog industry is further down the industrialization trail and has undergone 
significant structural realignment since the late 1980s. Consolidation in the pork industry 
is occurring at a rapid pace. In 1988, 32 percent of hogs marketed came from operations 
producing less that 1,000 head per year, and 7 percent came from operations over 50,000 
head.20 By 1997, only 5 percent came from 80,000 operations marketing less than 1,000 
head per year and 37 percent came from 145 operations marketing over 50,000 head 
each. In 1994, the top five producers owned about 8 percent of the swine breeding herd 
(sows) and the top 25 producers owned 15 percent. By 1999, the top producer owned 12 
percent, the top 5 owned 19 percent, and the top 25 owned 34 percent of the breeding 
herd. Further, much of the integration that is occurring is vertical. By 2002, the meat 
packer Smithfield, with 744,000 sows or 12.4 percent of the sow herd, was the leading 
producer. Meat packers Seaboard and Cargill also were counted among the top five.  
Important gains in efficiency have been achieved through genetics content and 
artificial insemination. The number of pigs per litter has increased 12.3 percent from 7.86 
in 1989 to 8.83 in 2002. The number of litters per sow also has increased, and the number 
of pounds of pork produced per sow in the breeding herd has grown by 27 percent 
between 1989 and 1999. Similar to poultry, significant increases in feed efficiency have 
been realized.21 
From our observations, it is evident that structural changes are underway in the pork 
industry that parallel those in the broiler industry. These changes have been facilitated by 
increased genetic standardization, which helps to create an environment conducive to 
experimenting.22 New production technologies, biased toward larger, more coordinated 
production processes, also have facilitated these structural changes. For example, 
electronic technologies, which monitor water and feed intake in hog facilities, can 
provide advanced warning of impending disease outbreaks and needed remedial 
responses. Such monitoring activities also complement experimentation by removing 
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stress-related noise from the production environment. Other production technologies, 
including artificial insemination, segregated early weaning, all-in/all-out turns, split sex, 
and phase feeding, promote herd uniformity and thus are likely to enhance the learning 
environment. 
As reported in Onishi et al. (2000), clones of mature pigs were farrowed in July 
2000. Mature sheep, cattle, and goats had been cloned over the preceding three years. In 
April 2002, clones from slaughtered beef cows were calved, allowing ex post selection on 
graded meat characteristics. Motivating the Onishi et al. study were the potential for 
clonal propagation of phenotypes in pork meat production and the possibility of 
xenotransplantation of organs into humans.23 The field has progressed so rapidly that 
cloned livestock were on farms by June 2001. In that month, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration informed two clone propagators that regulator consent would be required 
before products from clones could enter food and feed markets (Regalado 2001). Why 
this demand for cloned livestock in commercial production exists is not as obvious. Our 
theory suggests that breakthroughs in precision breeding may have as much effect on the 
rate of productivity growth through improved production practices and increased 
opportunities for informative tinkering as they do directly through improving herd 
genetic endowments. Microeconomic data from the poultry industry may be the best 
source for insight into the origins of productivity improvements and what may be in store 
for other livestock production sectors. 
 
Conclusion 
The implications of recent advances in life and information sciences are likely to be 
as dramatic for agriculture as for other economic sectors. The intent of this paper has 
been to identify pathways through which innovations in obtaining and using biological 
information could affect agriculture. We have shown how a refinement of the information 
sets available to processors can translate into a wider array of offered food products. And 
we have suggested a dynamic pathway through which information that allows uniformity 
in the production environment can enhance productivity.  
We do not claim that these are the only pathways through which biological 
information contributes to improved food sector productivity because a consequence may 
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have many contributing factors. We do conjecture that these are some of the most 
important pathways. But the general topic of how information affects the amount and 
variety of food offerings has not yet received the attention it deserves. Given the present 
rate of technical progress in the life and information sciences, and given the growing 
debate over policies to guide the industrialization of agriculture, it is crucial that a 
thorough analysis of the implications of these innovations for the nature of food 
production be undertaken. 
  
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
 
1. Knoeber (1989), in rationalizing the use of long-term broiler production contracts 
possessed of stipulations that establish bonding, has articulated essentially the same 
point. The informativeness of technology trials on the part of poultry contractors will 
vary directly with the stability of the grower base. 
 
2. This discourse on martingales relies heavily on Durrett 1996, pp. 231-33. Allen 
(1983), among others, has modeled economic information in this manner. 
 
3. See Durrett 1996, p. 1, on the definition of a σ-algebra. For the set of possible 
outcomes, Ω, the - σ-algebra  is a collection of subsets such that (a) if iA∈  then 
the complement of A in Ω, i.e., Ω/A, is in i , and (b) if 1{ }nj jA ≤∞=  is a possibly 
countably infinite sequence of sets in i , then 1 nj  j A≤∞=∪  is also in i . 
 
4. Caution is warranted because, for quite technical reasons, the analogy cannot be 
taken literally as i → ∞ . See Dubra and Enchenique 2001 for a careful treatment of 
filtrations as a means of modeling information. 
 
5. For those not familiar with using martingales, or the rational expectations models 
that often apply them, it is useful to bear in mind that the smallest (i.e., coarsest) 
information set always wins out when taking the expectation of linear functions, i.e., 
[ ( ) ( )] ( )i iE K  K   K∞ω = ω =  1[ [ ( ) | ( )] | ( )]i iE E K K K∞ +ω =   
1[ [ ( ) | ( )] | ( )] {0,1, },i iE E K K  K   i   K∞ + +ω ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈…   . 
 
6. Since ( ) [0 ,1]i K  ω ∈ , the process is uniformly integrable (Durrett 1996, p. 259). If 
( )i Kω  is a martingale, then it is known that lim ( ) [0,1]i i K→∞ ω ∈  converges almost 
surely and in L1 space, i.e., lim | ( ) ( ) | [ ( )]ii i iK K KdH→∞ ∞∫ ω − ω ω < ∞  (Durrett 1996, 
p. 261). And so, for a filtration of infinite sequence length, we may take for granted 
the existence of a limiting random variable. 
 
7. Although costly, beef farmers occasionally sonoscope feeder calves for muscling 
characteristics and use the information to form homogeneous feedlot pens. Referring 
to attempts by beef packers to replicate the success of poultry processors in meat 
market penetration, Kilman (January 2001) wrote: 
Still, one of the biggest complaints consumers have about red meat is its lack of 
consistent quality. So, to achieve better uniformity without trying to control the 
entire process, Tyson plans to accelerate IBPs strategy of doing more prepara-
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tion work on beef and pork. Marinating, pre-cooking and hand-trimming can 
eliminate a lot of the variety that comes with slaughtering scores of cattle 
breeds, all of which are different shapes and sizes.… 
 Tyson, a poultry processor, was then in the process of purchasing IBP, a beef and 
hog packing company. Also, Amana Beef Products of Amana, IA, has engaged in 
hand selection off the production line for its line of premium cuts. 
 
8. See Theorem 2.3, p. 232, in Durrett 1996. 
 
9. Assumption 3 could be relaxed without compromising the insights we will develop. 
But, because this route would require additional notation, we choose not to introduce 
sorting costs. 
 
10. The notation inf{ }S  represents the infimum, or greatest lower bound, of set S. The 
notation sup{ }S  represents the supremum, or least upper bound, of set S. 
 
11. See the Appendix for formal proofs of propositions not demonstrated in the text. 
 
12. A related issue has been studied in Athey and Levin 2001, where the context is a 
signal-contingent investment by a risk-averse firm.  
 
13. Annual crops are also better suited to indoor and accelerated global research 
programs. 
 
14. Most of the materials in this section report facts and opinions in Roberts 2000, 
Schwartz 1991, and Bugos 1992. 
 
15. These two themes may be linked. Rapid productivity improvements in a few traits 
are often achieved at the expense of other traits. Productive animals may be sicklier, 
and sickly creatures need more attentive husbandry unless the herd is relatively 
uniform. Herd homogeneity allows for the realization of scale economies in catering 
for the failings of fragile herd members. The skeleton and heart of a rapidly muscling 
broiler have difficulty supporting the maturing bird. Lameness and heart failure are 
serious problems in modern broiler production. 
 
16. The role of vertical links on food sector structural dynamics is likely to have been 
much more involved. See Bonaccorsi and Guiri 2001 for an interesting empirical 
study of vertical networks and dynamics in aviation sector markets. 
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17. Concerning a static environment, control is a precursor for the capacity to optimize 
over the control variable. Housing often provides the opportunity to control. Dahl 
(2001) reviews the literature on manipulating light exposure to optimize commercial 
bovine milk production. 
 
18. In a less formal framework, and concerning product design projects, Thomke (2001) 
provides interesting discussions on process engineering to take advantage of 
technological innovations that reduce the costs of experimentation. 
 
19. Consider the distribution function 1 2( , , , )nF x x x…  for some vector x. The random 
variables are exchangeable if the value of 1 2( , , , )nF x x x…  is invariant to permuta-
tions of coordinate values. For example, this is true of multivariate normal random 
variables if the marginals are common and the common correlation parameter is 
nonnegative. 
 
20. The estimates are based on Successful Farming Online; Lawrence, Grimes, and 
Hayenga 1998; and USDA-NASS Hogs and Pigs, various online. 
 
21. Based on the Iowa Swine Enterprise Records Program participants, feed efficiency 
has gone from 4.1 lb feed to 1 lb gain in 1979 to 3.8 lb in 1989 to 3.5 lb in 1999 for 
farrow-to-finish operations. 
 
22. By 2001, just 10 companies accounted for the majority of genetic seedstock 
marketed by swine companies (Ritchie 2001). 
 
23. The second author of that study, M. Iwamoto, was employed at the time of 
publication by a meat packing company. 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Fix the value of K , and consider 0[ ( )]V K  so that only product A is produced (see 
Assumption 1). Now, from Proposition 1, [ ( )]iV  K  is monotone in { }i  for any value of 
K . Define *[{ }]G i = max [ ( )]K iV K K− . If * *[{ }] [{0}]G i G>  then both A and B must 
be produced under { }i , for otherwise * *[{ }] [{0}]G i G= . It cannot be that only B is 
produced under information set { }i  because that would necessarily involve a violation of 
the martingale property, i.e., { ( ) : ( ) / }i iK K Lω ω ≥ δ  has null probability for some 
K +∈  and yet 0( )Kω =  [ ( )] /iE K  Lω ≥ δ  where ( )i Kω  is bounded. 
Because Proposition 1 asserts that * *[{ 1}] [{ }]G i   G i+ ≥ , if *[{ }]G i > *[{0}]G  then 
both A and B must be produced under { 1}i  +  too. If * *[{ }] [{0}]G i G= , then Proposition 
1 asserts that * *[{ }] [{ }]  {0,1, , }G i G i j  j i= − ∀ ∈ …  and only A is produced for 
{0,1, , } j i∈ … . All this leads to the conclusion that there exists some threshold *{ } { }i i=  
such that (a) and (b) apply.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
For part (a), we will demonstrate the result concerning index a . The other effects 
can be shown similarly. From the definition, together with the Schur-convexity of 
function {max[ ,0]}bE a ⋅ ε

, we have that a a′ ′′< ⇒  {max[ ,0]}bE a′ ⋅ ε ≤

 
{max[ ,0]}bE a′′ ⋅ ε

. Fix parameters other than a  and b . Remembering that the 
distribution from which bε

 is drawn is not dependent upon b , we see from 
( ; , , ) 0b b q Tg κ η >  that the b  satisfying ( ) 0Y ⋅ =  is decreasing as a a′ ′′→ . 
For part (b), observe that the denominator in equation (6) increases as T  increases. 
Concerning the numerator, we have { ( )}/ { ( ) / ( )} 0dE g dT E dg d T⋅ = η ⋅ η ≤ . Given 
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( ) 0bg ⋅ > , it follows that * / 0db dT > , and the measure of experiments engaged in 
declines with the age at slaughter because set *[ , ] b b  contracts.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Relation 0[ ( ) / ( ) | ] / 0a b Yd Y Y d=⋅ ⋅ κ >  implies that 0/ |Ydb da =  is decreasing in the value 
of κ , i.e., * 1 * 1 * 0 * 0 0 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )  b a b a b a b a′′ ′ ′′ ′κ − κ < κ − κ ∀ κ < κ . Interpreting, the 
threshold for engaged-in experiments decreases by more for the very curious than for the 
less curious. Relation 0[ ( ) / ( ) | ] / 0a b Yd Y Y d=⋅ ⋅ κ <  implies the reverse.  
As to part (b), write ( ) { ( ; , , )}r b E g b q T= κ η  and ( ) {max[ ,0]}bs a E a= ⋅ ε

. Note that 
if c  increases then *b  increases to restore equality in (6). So 0[ ( ) / ( ) | ] /a b Yd Y Y dc=⋅ ⋅  has 
the sign of 0[ ( ) / ( ) | ] /a b Yd Y Y db=⋅ ⋅ . This in turn has the sign of 2[ ( ) ( ) ( )]b bbr b r b r b− , i.e., of 
2 2ln[ ( )] /d g db− ⋅ . Therefore, * 1 * 1 * 0 * 0 0 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )  b a c b a c b a c b a c c c′′ ′ ′′ ′− < − ∀ <  if 
2 2ln[ ( )] / 0d g db⋅ < . And 2 2ln[ ( )] / 0d g db⋅ >  reverses the inequality on the differences in 
project threshold values.  
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